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A TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW:
THE INSURMOUNTABLE BURDEN IN
TOXIC TORT CLAIMS AGAINST
MANUFACTURERS OF CHILDREN’S
MEDICATIONS
Susanne L. Flanders∗
INTRODUCTION
The recent removal of many over-the-counter children’s cough
and cold medications from pharmacy shelves has raised public
concern about the dangers of children’s medications.1 Many drug
manufacturers voluntarily withdrew these drugs from the market
after the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommended that
they not be used in children under the age of six.2 The
recommendation came after studies showed that in 2004 more than
1500 infants had experienced “adverse events”3 following their
ingestion of cold and cough medications,4 and between 1969 and
2006, more than 120 children aged two and younger had died from
overdoses and toxicity associated with these drugs. 5 Despite these
Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2008; B.S., Villanova University, 2002.
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1
See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Makers Pull Infant Cold Medicines, N.Y.
T IMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A18.
2
Christopher Hollis, Advisory Committees Recommend Against Cough and
Cold Medications in Children Under 6, DRUG INDUSTRY DAILY , Oct. 22, 2007.
3
Bob Meadows, Baby Cold Medicine, PEOPLE , Oct. 29, 2007, at 74.
4
Id.
5
Debra Sherman, Drugmakers Recall Infant Cough/Cold Medicine,
REUTERS, Oct. 11, 2007.
∗
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findings, many pharmaceutical manufacturers have continued
selling their products.6 Furthermore, until a withdrawal is
mandated, manufacturers will continue to profit from these
medications while children continue to suffer the harmful
consequences.7
Every year, hundreds of thousands of people report to the
FDA that they have sustained a possible adverse drug reaction.8 In
fact, adverse reactions to medications are one of the leading causes
of death in the United States, accounting for more than 100,000
fatalities yearly. 9 Further, it has been suggested that this number
may be a gross underestimate because more than ninety percent of
adverse reactions go unreported or undetected.10
Adverse drug reactions create serious, widespread social
problems including increased morbidity and mortality rates, longer
6

See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Experts Seek Ban on Cold Medicine for Very
Young, N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at A1.
7
Catherine Larkin, Wyeth, J&J Halt U.S. Sales of Infant Cold Medicines,
Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aYrOYusxh3jI (“U.S. sales of non-prescription cold remedies for children
rose [twenty] percent to $311 million in year ended Sept.8 [2007], according to
market research firm AC Nielson.”).
8
Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing Experiential Data
to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH . U. L. REV . 449, 452 (2000) (citing
CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. D EP’ T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., 1998 REPORT TO THE N ATION 22 (1998), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rptntn98.pdf.).
9
Noah, supra note 8, at 449 (citing Denise Grady, Study Says Thousands
Die from Reaction to Medicine, N.Y. T IMES, Apr. 15, 1998, at A1; U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO/PEMID-90–15, FDA Drug Review:
Postapproval Risks 1976–85, at 3 (1990); Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of
Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-analysis of
Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1202 (1998); John A. Anderson, Allergic
Reactions to Drugs and Biological Agents, 268 JAMA 2845, 2845 (1992)).
10
One reason is that overburdened health care providers often fail to issue
Adverse Reaction Reports to manufacturers, who in turn, are unable to identify
when there is a problem with a medication they have produced. See Margaret
Berger & Aaron Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking
Daubert, 104 MICH . L. REV . 257, 261 (2005) (citing Michael A. Friedman,
What Is the Value of an FDA Approval in a Judicial Matter?, 12 J.L. & P OL ’ Y
559, 570 (2004)).
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hospital stays, and decreased quality of patient care.11 This places
high financial burdens on both patients and the health care system
as a whole.12 Perhaps more importantly, it puts the public in
harm’s way.
Many of the adverse drug reactions that were reported in the
past could be traced back to a lack of adequate safety testing that
resulted in insufficient data about the drugs.13 Of the “230,000
reports of possible adverse drug reactions” that the FDA receives
each year, “approximately ten percent of th[em] raise concerns
about serious reactions that pre-approval clinical trials failed to
detect.”14 The chairman of Pfizer recently acknowledged that
clinical trials often fail to reveal problems with the drugs, stating
“‘You put the drug in the general population, and then everyone is
taking it . . . . We just hold our breath and wait to see if there is
something unique with the drug.’”15
11

David W. Bates et al., The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in
Hospitalized Patients, 277 JAMA 307, 307, 311 (1997); Noah, supra note 8, at
450 (citing David C. Classen et al., Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized
Patients: Excess Length of Stay, Extra Costs, and Attributable Mortality, 277
JAMA 301, 301, 305 (1997)).
12
Bates, supra note 11, at 311; Noah, supra note 8, at 450 (citing David
C. Classen et al., Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: Excess Length
of Stay, Extra Costs, and Attributable Mortality, 277 JAMA 301, 301, 305
(1997)).
13
See Nathaniel Garrett, Note, “Life is a Risk We Cannot Refuse:” A
Precautionary Approach to Toxic Risks We Can, 17 GEO. INT ’ L ENVTL . L.
REV . 517, 531 (2005) (“This problem has even been documented by industry,
such as in a Chemical Manufacturers Association study which noted that
significant data is lacking in over ninety percent of the high-volume chemicals
used in United States commerce.”) (citing David Roe, Ready or Not: The
Coming Wave of Toxic Chemicals, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 627–28 (2002)).
14
Noah, supra note 8, at 452 (citing CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION &
RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’ T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 1998 REPORT TO THE
NATION 22 (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rptntn98.pdf.).
15
Melody Petersen, Unforeseen Side Effects Ruined One Blockbuster, N.Y.
T IMES, Aug 27, 2000, at § 3 (Money and Business/Financial Desk), at 11
(quoting William C. Steere Jr., the chairman of Pfizer, following the removal of
its drug, Trovan, from the market). Trovan was a popular antibiotic that was
prescribed to approximately 300,000 patients a month before it was shown to
have caused serious side effects including liver toxicity and death. Id. These side
effects hadn’t been detected in the clinical trials that Pfizer conducted prior to
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Children’s medications undergo even less safety testing.16 In
fact, approximately seventy-five percent of medications that are
prescribed to pediatric populations have only been studied for use
in adults, 17 indicating that any information about the safety and
efficacy of most pediatric drugs is inadequate or simply absent. 18
As a result, pediatricians and other health care providers are often
forced to prescribe drugs that lack adequate pediatric dosing
information and that have not been proven safe and effective for
use in children.19 Because child-tested drugs rarely exist,20 it is very
common for physicians, after the FDA has approved a drug for
adult use, to issue off-label prescriptions to children wherein they
must use physiological and pharmacokinetic principles from adults
to make judgments about what dosages and usages of medications
are safe for children.21 This method, however, is often flawed
because children vary from adults in many respects, including the
methods and rates at which they metabolize drugs. 22 Further, the
FDA does not regulate this practice in any manner whatsoever.23
Children, therefore, are regularly exposed to medications that are, at
best, ineffective in treating their ailments, and at worse, pose
FDA approval). Id.
16
See David Wendler et al., Quantifying the Federal Minimum Risk
Standard, 292 JAMA 826 (2005).
17
Id. (citing R. Roberts, W. Rodriguez, D. Murphy & T. Crescenzi,
Pediatric Drug Labeling: Improving the Safety and Efficacy of Pediatric
Therapies, 290 JAMA 905, 905–11 (2003)).
18
Peter P. Budetti, Ensuring Safe and Effective Medications for Children,
290 JAMA 950, 950 (2003) (citing R. Roberts, W. Rodriguez, D. Murphy &
T. Crescenzi, Pediatric Drug Labeling: Improving the Safety and Efficacy of
Pediatric Therapies, 290 JAMA 905, 905–11 (2003)).
19
Id.
20
See id.
21
Id.
22
Duane Alexander, Regulation of Research With Children: The Evolution
From Exclusion to Inclusion, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’ Y 1, 1 (2002) (“It
had been amply demonstrated that children were not just small adults, and in
many instances attempts to extrapolate from adult studies to applications in
children were folly.”).
23
Alexander, supra note 22, at 1 (citing Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney,
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
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dangerous risks that often result in serious injury and sometimes
death. 24
Sometimes drug manufacturers make a “willful, strategic
choice” not to conduct adequate testing.25 For example, “[m]akers
of . . . Bendectin [and] DES . . . dug in their heels and resisted
conducting safety research on their products, even when
preliminary study indicated that the [medications] harmed the
public.”26 This approach is still common among manufacturers,
despite instances when they have been held at least partially liable
for failing to adequately test their products and for the resulting
harm the products caused.27
Worse yet, sometimes manufacturers are fully aware of the
dangers associated with their products, but still keep them on the
market without adequately warning consumers:
Numerous industries that have had exclusive information
about the risk posed by their product have concealed
information to protect their bottom-line: examples include
the tobacco industry, which long denied a causal link
between smoking and disease; the asbestos industry, which
concealed evidence associating asbestos with lung disease
24

See Wendler et al., supra note 16, at 826 (citing P.H.Y. Caldwell, S.B.
Murphy, P.H. Butow, & J.C. Craig, Clinical Trials in Children, 364 LANCET
803, 803–11 (2004)).
25
Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental
Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE
L.J. 1619, 1638 (2004).
26
Id. at 1638–39 (2004) (citing Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation:
A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 321
(1992) (explaining that Bendectin’s manufacturer, Merrell Dow, faced a great
deal of claims alleging the product was linked to birth defects because the
company did not conduct substantial testing before the drug was marketed);
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1982) (DES was a drug that
was prescribed to help prevent miscarriages. However, the drug was marketed by
Eli Lilly & Co. before adequate testing had been conducted. It was later
determined that if the company had properly tested the drug in mice, its
carcinogenic tendencies would have been detected)).
27
Wagner, supra note 25, at 1639 (2004) (citing James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate
Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV . 765, 779 (1983)).

FLANDERS F INAL DRAFT A UTHOR IZED . DOC

310

12/3/07 5:16 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

for thirty years; the Industrial Bio-Test (IBT) scandal in
which a contract toxicology facility that conducted forty
percent of all United States toxicological testing
systematically understated cases of cancer in animals in
laboratory tests of pesticides; and historical concealment by
the lead, silica and vinyl industries.28
We now know that corporations involved in the manufacturing of
many widely used products did not conduct adequate pre-market
testing, did not disclose information regarding potential harmful
side effects when the information was ascertained, and chose not to
conduct additional testing in light of information about adverse
effects. 29 “‘These companies just do it again and again . . . . They
try to create much larger markets for these drugs than is warranted,
particularly given what they know about the risks.’”30
Drug manufacturers’ failure to conduct adequate safety testing
and disclose known risks persists despite FDA regulation.31 The
studies that are required by the FDA are often insufficient to
establish a causal link between a plaintiff’s injury and the
medication because they don’t account for latent effects, rare
reactions, population variations, drug interactions, and pre-existing
susceptibilities to injury. 32 Moreover, after the FDA has approved
a drug, it does not have the authority over drug manufacturers to
require further research, even when physicians prescribe the drug
for uses that have not been adequately tested.33 As a result of
28

Garrett, supra note 13, at 559 (2005) (citing W ILLIAM LEISS &
CHRISTINA CHOCIOLKO , R ISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 53 (1994)).
29
Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a
New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM . L. REV . 2117, 2135
(1997) (citing PETER H. SCHUCK, A GENT ORANGE ON T RIAL (1986); PAUL
BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT (1985); MICHAEL D. GREEN ,
BENDECTIN AND B IRTH DEFECTS 96–120 (1996); MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE
ON TRIAL: T HE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST
IMPLANT CASE (1996); KAREN M. H ICKS, SURVIVING THE DALKON SHIELD
IUD (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES (1996)).
30
Alex Berenson, Drug Industry Braces for New Suits Over Even More of
Its Products, N.Y. T IMES, Apr. 22, 2006, at C1.
31
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2136.
32
Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 261.
33
Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 261 (citing Steven R. Salbu, Off-
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budget cuts and policy changes within the agency, the FDA’s
power to monitor drugs has decreased even further over the past
decades.34
Parts I.A and I.B of this Note discuss the history of medication
testing for pediatric use in the United States, including the ethical
debate surrounding experimentation in children and the resulting
financial disincentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers. Part I.C
focuses on recent developments in the safety regulation of
children’s medications. Part II.A suggests that the legal tort system
is a well-suited device for protecting children from unsafe
medications. Parts II.B and II.C address the causation burden that
plaintiffs face in toxic tort cases,35 opining that it presents an
insurmountable burden for children who have been injured and
bring a subsequent lawsuit. Part III surveys a series of proposals as
suggested by legal scholars to address this burden.
I.

T HE HISTORY OF RESEARCH ON C HILDREN’S M EDICATIONS
A. The Early Ethical Dilemmas

In the early twentieth century, there was very little knowledge
in the United States regarding childhood health and development. 36
Research that was conducted on children, which “sometimes
included infants, orphans, and wards of the state,” did not receive
much attention and was not well-regulated.37 For instance, the
Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA . L. R EV . 181 (1999)).
34
Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 261.
35
See generally Craig T. Smith, Peering Into the Microscope: The Rise of
Judicial Gatekeeping After Daubert And Its Effect on Federal Toxic Tort
Litigation, 13 B.U. J. SCI . & T ECH. L. 218, 224 (2007) (“A toxic tort, in its
most general sense, is a physical or psychological harm to an individual due to
exposure to a chemical factor. Common examples include harm caused by
asbestos, lead poisoning, and air pollution.”).
36
See Alexander, supra note 22, at 1.
37
Alexander, supra note 22, at 1 (“There was some casual concern in the
United States in the middle of the twentieth century about research that was
conducted on healthy children, but it didn’t rise to the level of protest that
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individuals who wrote the Nuremberg Code of 1949, which was
created after at the end of World War II to set forth principles
regarding human experimentation, neglected to consider the issues
surrounding research in children.38 Similarly, the 1964 Declaration
of Helsinki of the World Medical Association, which gave rise to a
standard practice of “third party authorization for non-therapeutic
research,”39 failed to mention children altogether.40
By the early 1970’s, however, the ethical debate regarding the
appropriateness of clinical research on children was in full swing,41
and “informed consent” was at the forefront of the dispute. 42 There
was uncertainty as to what constituted informed consent and the
extent to which it permitted research on children. In 1971, for
example, the National Institute of Health published the
Institutional Guide to the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare Policy on Protection of Human Subjects and required
either the consent of the individual on whom the research was being
conducted or the consent of his authorized representative.43
However, the publication failed to specify exactly what constituted
informed consent or the circumstances under which it would
apply. 44 Scholars such as Paul Ramsey 45 argued, “any nontherapeutic research on children was absolutely unethical—even

existed in Europe at the time.”).
38
Alexander, supra note 22, at 1–2 (citing Nuremberg Code, Principle 1
(1946), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html).
39
Alexander, supra note 22, at 2.
40
Alexander, supra note 22, at 2 (citing World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of
Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects
(1964), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm).
41
See Alexander, supra note 22, at 2 (“the existing guidelines [regarding
research in children] had come under attack from a number of fronts.”).
42
See Alexander, supra note 22, at 3–7 (discussing the primacy of informed
consent amidst debates regarding the clinical research on children).
43
Alexander, supra note 22, at 2.
44
Alexander, supra note 22, at 2 (citing NIH, The Institutional Guide To
DHEW Policy on Protection of Human Subjects (Pub. No. 72–102) (1971)).
45
PAUL RAMSEY , T HE PATIENT AS PERSON 11–19 (3d ed., 1973) (1970).
Paul Ramsey is a nationally recognized scholar from Princeton University, who
is well-regarded for his writings and lectures regarding medical ethics.
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with parental approval.”46
The debate caught the eye of the scientific community,
particularly after it became the subject of several lawsuits. In one
suit,47 a professor at the University of California in San Francisco
(the “University”) filed for an injunction because a study
conducted at the University involved paying families $300 for
allowing their child to participate in allergy/asthma pharmaceutical
testing.48 The study proposed to perform invasive medical
procedures on otherwise healthy children in order to study the
effects. 49 The complaint “asked the court to declare that ‘a parent
or a guardian of a normal, healthy minor may not subject that child
to experimental medical procedures not intended to benefit such
child and that the approval of such conduct by the defendants is
unconstitutional, invalid, and void.’”50 Although the professor’s
“application was denied on the grounds that he failed to show
sufficient standing and irreparable injury to warrant issuance of
injunctive relief,” his case brought widespread attention to the
informed consent debate.51
Another case that examined the limits of parental consent was
Strunk v. Strunk, 52 which centered around a twenty-eight year old
man who suffered from a fatal kidney disease. His brother, a
physically healthy twenty-seven year old, had been committed to a
state institution due to his mental incompetence which rendered
him the mental equivalent of a six year old. The mother consented
46

Alexander, supra note 22, at 2.
Alexander, supra note 22, at 3 (citing Nielson v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. et al., dismissed, No. 665-049 (Super. Ct. San Francisco, Cal. 1973)).
48
Alexander, supra note 22, at 3 (citing Letter from Oscar L. Frick, M.D.,
Professor Pediatrics, University of California, San Francisco, School of
Medicine, Department of Pediatrics To The Committee of Human
Experimentation, University of California, San Francisco, School of Medicine,
Department of Pediatrics (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
49
Alexander, supra note 22, at 3.
50
Alexander, supra note 22, at 3–4 (citing Nielson, No. 665-048 at 13).
51
Gerald P. Koocher & Patricia C. Keith-Spiegel, Children, Ethics, and
the Law: Professional Issues and Cases 155 (1990) (original manuscript of outof-print work), available at http://www.kspope.com/ethics/Children_Ethics_
and_the_Law.pdf.
52
445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
47
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to the removal and transplant of the incompetent brother’s kidney
into the ailing brother.53 However, the court “held that parental
control alone was not sufficient for a minor child to serve as a
kidney . . . donor to a sibling and that court approval was required,
given that the parents had a conflict of interest and that the donor
did not stand to benefit from the procedure.”54 The threat of
further suits like these stifled clinical research on children and
highlighted the need for clear guidelines in this area of the law.55
The Federal government became involved in 1977 when “the
[National] Commission [for Protection of Human Subjects in
Biomedical and Behavioral Research] issued its report and
recommendations on research involving children.”56 The
Commission recommended a change in the terminology associated
with child research; specifically, that parental “consent” be changed
to “permission” to reflect the notion that parents lacked the
authority to unilaterally subject their children to clinical research
without the child’s assent. 57 The Commission also included a
system that categorized all types of research on children into one
53

Id. at 146.
Alexander, supra note 22, at 2–3.
55
See Alexander, supra note 22, at 2–4.
56
Alexander, supra note 22, at 7 (citing NAT ’ L COMM’ N FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV . RESEARCH,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN (DHEW
Pub. No. (OS) 77-0004) (1977), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/report/
past_commissions/Research_involving_children.pdf).
57
See NAT ’ L COMM ’ N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
B IOMEDICAL & BEHAV . RESEARCH, REPORT AND R ECOMMENDATIONS:
RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 12–13 (DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 77-0004)
(1977), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/report/past_commissions/
Research_involving_children.pdf (stating:
The Commission uses the term parental or guardian “permission,”
rather than “consent,” in order to distinguish what a person may do
autonomously (consent) from what one may do on behalf of another
(grant permission). Parental permission normally will be required for
the participation of children in research. In addition, assent of children
should be required when they are seven years of age or older. The
Commission uses the term “assent” rather than “consent” in this
context, to distinguish a child’s agreement from a legally valid
consent.).
54
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of four risk levels, each of which contained elements of permission
and/or benefit to the child that had to be satisfied before the
research could continue.58 It took six years for the Department of
Health to finish implementing the Commission’s numerous
recommendations.59 The result was the implementation of
guidelines aimed at allowing important clinical research to proceed
while protecting children from exploitation.60
B. Financial Disincentives For Safety Testing in Children’s
Medications
In addition to the ethical considerations that hamper clinical
research of children, there are also economic hurdles.61 Because
“children consume a relatively small proportion of prescription”
drugs,62 pharmaceutical manufacturers have little incentive to
conduct clinical studies on children’s medications; rather, their
efforts are better spent, financially speaking, on testing and
producing adult medications. Widespread off-label use of adult
medications in children further decreases the financial incentive for
manufacturers to conduct child safety testing because they stand to
profit from pediatric sales of drugs even without such studies.63 As
a result, pharmaceutical manufacturers, who are often concerned
about the “bottom line” above all else, are unlikely to conduct
pediatric testing on the drugs they produce, thereby leaving
58

Alexander, supra note 22, at 9–10 (citing NAT ’ L COMM’ N FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV . RESEARCH,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 7–8, 14
(Pub. No. (OS) 77-0004) (1977) (“The Society for Research on Child
Development and a developmental psychologist provided valuable information
[to the National Committee for Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and
Behavioral Research] on the ability of children of various ages to make choices
about participating in research.”).
59
Alexander, supra note 22, at 10 (citing Additional Protections For
Children Involved As Subjects in Research, 45 C.F.R. § 46, 409 (1983)).
60
Alexander, supra note 22, at 10.
61
Budetti, supra note 18, at 950 (citing R. Steinbrook, Testing
Medications in Children, 347 NEW ENG . J. MED . 1462, 1462–70 (2002)).
62
Budetti, supra note 18, at 950.
63
Budetti, supra note 18, at 950.
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children vulnerable to dangerous drugs.64
C. The Current State of Affairs
Although things have changed since the days when “the dosage
was just extrapolated from adult doses, effectiveness and side
effects were assumed with fingers crossed, and physicians who
prescribed these drugs for children did so at their own risk,”65 the
current state of affairs is nonetheless alarming. In 1996, members of
the American Academy of Pediatrics and the National Institute of
Health (“NIH”) examined a wide array of clinical studies that the
NIH had funded during the previous year and found that children
were often excluded from testing populations in which they could
have appropriately been included.66 They concluded, therefore,
that children were not receiving the best possible care.67
In response to this situation, Congress and the NIH have
implemented laws and policies intended to increase pediatric
testing where it is safe and responsible to do so.68 In 1997 and
2002, for example, Congress passed the Better and Best
Pharmaceuticals for Children Acts which extended patent
protection afforded to drug companies who conducted pediatric
testing.69 In 1998, the NIH endorsed a policy that required clinical
investigators to “describe their plans for including children [in

64

See Budetti, supra note 18, at 950.
Alexander, supra note 22, at 11.
66
Alexander, supra note 22, at 11.
67
Alexander, supra note 22, at 11 (citing National Institute of Child Health
& Human Development, Inclusion of Children In Clinical Research Workshop
(Sept. 5, 1996) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy)).
68
See Alexander, supra note 22, at 12.
69
Alexander, supra note 22, at 12 (citing Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–155, 111 Stat. 2305 (1997); Best
Pharmaceuticals Act for Children of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–109, 115 Stat. 1408
(2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov); see also Budetti, supra note 18, at
951 (“Congress has passed two laws to encourage pharmaceutical manufacturers
to test their products in the pediatric population, relying heavily on the financial
incentives from extended marketplace exclusivity (delaying introduction of
generic drugs).”).
65
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clinical trials] or justify the exclusion.”70 This policy has increased
the number of clinical studies in which children are properly
included.71
While these measures have achieved some positive results, not
every effort to increase pediatric testing has been successful. First,
it is important to remember that ethical considerations often
preclude manufacturers from including children in clinical trials
even when legislation encourages them to do so. Additionally, new
regulations are not always upheld. For example, in 1998, the FDA
implemented the Pediatric Rule, which empowered the agency to
“require the testing of new drugs in children.”72 However, in 2002,
the D.C. Circuit Court 73 struck down the rule for “exceeding the
FDA’s statutory authority.”74 Finally, sometimes the benefits of
lawful corporate behavior are outweighed by the incentives to
violate regulatory statutes. In other words, as long as
pharmaceutical manufacturers stand to lose less money from noncompliance with new legislation and regulations than they stand to
gain from the sale of under-tested and potentially hazardous
pediatric medications, this dangerous practice will continue. As a
result, additional legal safeguards are necessary to protect children
from medications that have not been proven safe for pediatric
use.75

70

Alexander, supra note 22, at 12.
Alexander, supra note 22, at 12.
72
Alexander, supra note 22, at 12 (citing Regulations Requiring
Manufacturers to Assess the Safety And Effectiveness of New Drugs and
Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,632 (Dec. 2, 1998)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 312, 314, 601)).
73
Ass’n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., et al., v. U.S. Food and
Drug Admin., 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
74
Alexander, supra note 22, at 12; see also Budetti, supra note 18, at 951.
75
Budetti, supra note 18, at 951.
71
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II. T HE T ORT SYSTEM
A. Using the Tort System to Protect Children From Dangerous
Medications
The tort system is one tool that children may turn to for
protection from toxic drugs. Tort law has been used somewhat
effectively in the past to deal with manufacturers who have placed
harmful drugs and medical devises on the market.76 In many of
those cases, “it appears that the corporations took virtually no
steps to determine or minimize the possibility of harm until their
hands were forced, usually by litigation.”77 Once litigation ensued,
materials uncovered during discovery often revealed “smoking gun”
documents that demonstrated that the manufacturers knew that
there were problems with their products before the victims
suffered injury. 78
The goals of tort law are well-suited to defending children
against unsafe and inadequately tested medications. Children who
have been injured as a result of their ingestion of a toxic medication
can seek to be compensated for their injuries by bringing a tort
claim against the manufacturer of the drug.79 Such claims, if
successful, can be used to deter risky or negligent behavior80 on the
part of manufacturers by making it economically beneficial to take
measures that reduce the occurrence and severity of toxic
exposures.81 Successful claims also spread the losses associated
76

Such as in litigation of “Agent Orange, asbestos, Bendectin, breast
implants, the Dalkon Shield, thalidomide, tobacco, and other substances.”
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2135.
77
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2135.
78
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2135 (citing
PAUL BRODEUR, O UTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 99–102, 109–13, 143–44 (1985)).
79
Anthony Z. Roisman, Martha L. Judy & Daniel Stein, Preserving
Justice: Defending Toxic Tort Litigation, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV . 191,
193 (2004); see also Stuart Taylor Jr., Product Liability: The New Morass,
N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 10, 1985, § 3, at 1; Garrett, supra note 13, at 536.
80
Taylor, supra note 79, at 1; see also Garrett, supra note 13, at 536.
81
Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 193.
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with the ingestion of dangerous medications from the victim to the
manufacturer, which is both fair and economically efficient. 82
B. The Plaintiff’s Causation Burden
Although victims may turn to the courts after they have
suffered the harmful effects of unsafe medications, the tort system
does not always provide the protection these individuals need.
One reason is that there are inherent barriers that plaintiffs must
overcome in order to bring successful tort claims. Specifically, they
must not only prove that they suffered an injury, but also must
prove “cause-in-fact” by a preponderance of the evidence.83
“Cause-in-fact” usually encompasses two separate elements:
general causation and specific causation.84 In the context of
allegedly toxic medications, “plaintiffs have the burden of proving
that the defendant’s product was capable of causing the health
effects in question (general causation) and then establishing, in
addition, that the exposure to the defendant’s product was the
specific cause of their injury (specific causation).”85 Thus, the
heavy burden falls on the plaintiff to establish both causation and
damages.86
Toxic tort claims turn, and often fail, on the causation issue
because it is unusual for plaintiffs to be able to provide a “direct
explanation of a causal process.”87 In other words, a plaintiff often
82

See Garrett, supra note 13, at 535–36.
Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential
Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of
Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110 (2001)
(citing DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990)).
84
Id.
85
Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests:
The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 297 (2001) (citing In re Joint E.
& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995)).
86
See Garrett, supra note 13, at 553.
87
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2120–21
(1997) (citing Mario J. Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals to Causation,
Symposium on Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 CHI .-KENT L. REV . 397, 403
(1987) (citing JACK B. W EINSTEIN , INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
83
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does not know, and therefore cannot explain, the precise biological
mechanism by which the medication they ingested produced their
injuries, despite evidence that the causal relationship exists. While
scientific experts 88 may be able to speculate about the way in
which the medication allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injury, that
plaintiff will fail to prove causation if he is armed with nothing
more than mere speculation.
In an effort to formulate an opinion based on more than mere
speculation, a plaintiff’s expert witness may rely upon several
different kinds of evidence. Four common types of scientific
studies used are: 1) structure-activity analyses, 2) animal
bioassays, 3) in vitro studies, and 4) case reports/series. In
structure-activity analyses, also called chemical-structure analyses,
scientists examine substances that have a similar chemical structure
to the medication the plaintiff claims caused their injury in order to
determine if those substances have been associated with adverse
health reactions.89 If so, the expert can draw inferences about the
medication that is the subject of the litigation.90 Animal bioassays
LITIGATION 148 (1995) (Judge Weinstein observed that “causation is the
central, decisive factor in mass tort litigation.”))).
88
In most toxic tort actions, plaintiffs often employ causation experts “who
seek to link exposure and injury in order to establish both general and specific
causation.” See Laurie Alberts, Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: “Which
Way Do We Go, Judge?,” 12 VILL . ENVTL. L.J. 33, 40 (2001) (citing M. Neil
Browne, Terri J. Keeley & Wesley J. Heirs, The Epistemological Role of
Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, n.19 (Fall 1998)). An
expert witness is “one, who, by training, education, or experience, has acquired
a special level of skill or knowledge in some art, science, profession, or calling.”
Alberts, supra note 88, at 39–40 (citing Hon. Mark I. Bernstein, Expert
Testimony in Pennsylvania, 68 T EMP. L. REV . 699 n.2 (1995)). “Since
causation is often the central issue in toxic tort claims, the success or failure of
the case may well hinge on the expert testimony.” Alberts, supra note 88, at 40
(citing Cynthia H. Cwik, Guarding the Gate: Expert Evidence Admissibility, 25
No. 4 A.B.A. J. S EC . LITIG . 6 (Summer 1999)).
89
Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 298–99; see also
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123; Alberts, supra
note 88, at 52 (discussing the use of pharmacological studies).
90
Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 298–99; see also
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123; Alberts, supra
note 88, at 52 (discussing the use of pharmacological studies).
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(or “in vivo” studies) are toxicological studies that utilize carefully
controlled experimental conditions to determine the effects of the
medication on laboratory animals.91 Experts use these studies to
draw inferences about the effect of these medications on humans. 92
In vitro studies examine the effects of the medication “on living
cells, bacteria, body organs, or animal embryos . . . in isolation from
the rest of the organism,”93 providing a basis for experts to further
extrapolate the impact the medication may have on an entire
organism.94 Finally, case reports and series are uncontrolled
observational studies that follow an individual or series of
individuals who have been exposed to the medication, taking into
account factors such as gender and age.95 Experts then use this
information to draw conclusions about the general effects of the
medication.96
Although it is common for scientists to rely upon the results of
these various types of studies,97 reliance by toxic tort experts is
91

Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2124.
Using results of adverse reactions in animals to prove causation in
humans requires at least two assumptions: first, that if a substance is
toxic in animals it will also be toxic in humans, a conclusion that is
known not always to be true, and second, that humans will suffer an
adverse effect from a low dose of a substance, even though laboratory
animals are given much higher and more constant dosages so as to
induce a measurable reaction.
Id.; see also In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), Mass Tort Code 264, 2003
WL22417238, at *18–19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 21, 2003).
92
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2124.
93
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123–24.
94
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123–24.
95
See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), Mass Tort Code 264, 2003
WL22417238, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 21, 2003).
96
Id.
97
See, e.g., id. at *17 (“In many scientific disciplines, the use of case
reports is longstanding, as evidenced by the continued publication of such
reports in peer-reviewed scientific journals.”); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic
Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96
YALE L.J. 376, 394 (1986) (“Inferences from animal and in vitro studies . . . are
widely supported by regulators and scientists.”); Berger, Upsetting the Balance,
supra note 85, at 298–99; In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), Mass Tort Code
264, 2003 WL22417238, at *18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 21, 2003)
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controversial because the studies contain substantial
uncertainties.98 For instance, structure-activity analysis “is
probative [of the toxicity of the accused drug] only if the adverse
reaction [from the chemical that was studied] . . . is due to an
attribute the substances have in common, rather than one that sets
[the two chemicals] apart.”99 Thus, if scientists have not identified
how the substance in the study caused the adverse reaction, it
cannot be said with any certainty that it was caused by an attribute
the substance has in common with the accused medication, and the
structure-activity analysis has no probative value.100 The concern
with in vivo studies is that they may attempt to oversimplify the
human body by extrapolating from animals.101 Similarly, because in
vitro research is conducted on cells that are isolated from the rest of
the organism, scientists do not know if the substance would react
the same way when exposed to the body as a whole.102 Lastly, case
studies are often criticized because they do not control for outside
variables103 such as pre-existing health conditions; therefore,
experts cannot say with certainty that an adverse reaction was
caused by the accused medication and not the outside variables.
Although the aforementioned types of studies may not provide
a legally adequate basis for an expert opinion on causation,
epidemiological studies are generally viewed as the best proof of
general
causation.104
Epidemiologists
examine
human
(“Toxicological research often provides the best scientific evidence about the
risk of a disease from chemical exposure and the metabolic, cellular, and other
physiological effects of chemical exposure . . . .”).
98
See Gold, supra note 97, at 394.
99
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123.
100
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123 (citing
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL ., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: T HE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT T ESTIMONY § 27-1.3.1, at 263 n.26 (1997)).
101
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2124 (citing
Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH . L. REV . 1795, 1811 n.58 (1989)).
102
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2123–24.
103
See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), Mass Tort Code 264, 2003
WL22417238, at *27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 21, 2003).
104
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2125; see
also Alberts, supra note 88, at 49 (“With respect to the establishment of
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populations105 to ascertain the causes of health problems in those
populations.106 More specifically, when studying the effects of an
accused medication, an epidemiological study compares a
population of people who have been exposed to the drug with an
unexposed population to determine whether associations can be
made between the drug and its effects. 107 When epidemiological
studies show correlations between exposure and adverse reactions,
these associations are considered credible evidence of causation in
the toxic tort setting.108

causation in toxic tort litigation, this science is aimed at proving general, as
opposed to specific, causation.”).
105
Garrett, supra note 13, at 524 (citing Dinah Shelton, The Impact of
Scientific Uncertainty on Environmental Law and Policy in the United States,
in T HE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 209–210
(David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996)); Alberts, supra note 88, at 49;
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2125; Gold, supra
note 97, at 379.
106
Alberts, supra note 88, at 49 (citing Christopher H. Buckley Jr. &
Charley H. Haake, Separating the Scientist’s Wheat from the Charlatan’s
Chaff: Daubert’s Role in Toxic Tort Litigation, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10293
(June 1998)). See also Douglas L. Weed, Causation: An Epidemiologic
Perspective (In Five Parts), 12 J.L. & POL ’ Y 43, 44 (2003) (“Epidemiology is
the study of the distributions and [causal] determinants of disease in populations
and the application of this study to control health problems.”).
107
Gold, supra note 97, at 380 (citing Devin Brennan, Book Note, 30
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV . 565 (2006) (reviewing CARL F. CRANOR, T OXIC
T ORTS: SCIENCE , LAW , AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (2006)). See also
Garrett, supra note 13, at 528 (stating:
The gold standard of epidemiological studies is a randomized, placebocontrolled double blind study where a sample population is exposed to
an agent within a controlled environment and then compared to a group
that has unwittingly been given a placebo. Neither the physician nor
the patient knows which members of the trial are exposed to the real
agent in hopes of isolating and determining the effects of a given agent
to the greatest possible extent.).
108

Gold, supra note 97, at 380 (citing Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld,
Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV . 732,
762–64 (1984)).
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C. Causation in Child Toxic Tort Cases: An Insurmountable
Burden

1.

The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert Standard

Given the varying degree of credibility attributed to different
types of scientific studies, judges face a difficult task when
determining whether to admit expert opinions based on such
studies.109 The Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”), which were
enacted in 1975, provided some guidance on the issue. Specifically,
FRE 702 created a standard of expert opinion admissibility that
was based on a notion of reliability, 110 and FRE 703 provided that
experts may base their opinions on “the kind of information on
which similar experts would rely in making non-litigation-oriented
professional judgments.”111 These rules gave federal judges
direction when determining the admissibility of expert testimony
based on scientific evidence.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,112 the United States
Supreme Court elaborated upon the requirements of FRE 702.113
The petitioners in that case were children who claimed their
109

See Alberts, supra note 88, at 40.
Alberts, supra note 88, at 43 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)). FED . R. EVID . 702, as originally enacted, read: “If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” FED . R. EVID . 702. The rule
was amended on December 1, 2000.
111
Evidence Law News, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
http://forensic-evidence.com/site/EVID/EL00003_4.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2007 (stating that “under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the emphasis shifted,
away from the admissibility of the facts upon which an expert’s opinion was
based, to the reliability of these facts as determined by the profession in arriving
at professional judgments independent of litigation.”).
112
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
113
See Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Healthy Policy, and
Common Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN . J.L. SCI . & TECH . 89, 111 (2005); see
also Alberts, supra note 88, at 43.
110
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mothers’ ingestion of the drug Bendectin caused their birth
defects. 114 They offered experts who opined that there was a causal
relationship between the drug and the defects based on several
types of studies including “animal studies, chemical structure
analysis and unpublished reanalysis of previously published
human studies.”115 The Court “explicitly anointed the trial judge as
the ‘gatekeeper’”116 who must ensure that “an expert’s testimony
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”117
The Court advised that the judge should examine the reasoning and
methodology that underlies the testimony of the expert in order to
determine its reliability. 118 The Court also offered some “‘general
observations’ in order to ‘help’ federal judges determine whether a
particular scientific theory or technique is ‘scientific knowledge
that will assist the trier of fact.’”119
The Daubert factors, which focus primarily on reliability
are: 1) whether the theory or technique can be used or has
been tested; 2) whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication; 3) whether the
theory or technique has been “generally accepted” within
the scientific community; 4) whether a potential rate of
error exists in cases involving particular scientific
techniques; and 5) whether standards which control the
technique’s operation exist and were maintained.120
The Daubert test is widely viewed as a flexible approach because
114

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
Garrett, supra note 13, at 526 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583–84).
116
Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 293 (citing Daubert,
509 U.S. at 589); see also Klass, supra note 113, at 111 (“In order to allow
expert, scientific testimony to be presented at trial, the trial judge must
determine at the outset whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology
properly can be applied to the facts.”); Berger, Eliminating General Causation,
supra note 29, at 2122.
117
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; see Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra
note 85, at 293 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589); see also Klass, supra note
113, at 111; Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2122.
118
Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 135.
119
Alberts, supra note 88, at 44 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593).
120
Alberts, supra note 88, at 44 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593).
115
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no single factor is dispositive of evidentiary reliability, 121 not all
factors are applicable in all cases,122 and some factors may take on
more importance than others in appropriate circumstances. 123
Further, the Court’s emphasis on the trial judge as gatekeeper
“appear[ed] to liberalize admissibility requirements”124 by giving
the judge a high level of discretion in determining whether scientific
evidence and testimony is based on reliable methodology. 125 Under
Daubert, a judge should admit evidence so long as he determines
that it is reliable and useful to the jury. 126
In 2000, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence amended FRE 702 to reflect its endorsement of the
Daubert standard.127 However, while the amendment was intended
to be consistent with the Daubert holding, its language was more
restrictive than Daubert in terms of the rules for the admissibility
of scientific evidence.128 Specifically, the amended FRE 702
121

Steven B. Loomis, The Daubert Test of Reliability: Fighting “Junk
Science in the Courtrooms,” SKEPTIC REPORT, Nov. 2002, http://www.
skepticreport.com/skepticism/dauberttest.htm (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591–
93).
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Garrett, supra note 13, at 526 (citing Joseph Sanders et al., Legal
Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB . POL ’ Y & L.
139, 142 (2002)).
125
Garrett, supra note 13, at 526 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592) (citing
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW , SCIENCE, AND T ECHNOLOGY
IN AMERICA 58 (Harvard 1995) (stating: “The judge does this through a voir
dire examination, and on the basis of questions asked by counsel for both parties
‘the trial judge forms an initial opinion of the expert’s claim to specialized
knowledge and determines whether the witness should be admitted or not.’”).
126
Garrett, supra note 13, at 526–27 (citing Stephen Charest, Bayesian
Approaches to the Precautionary Principle, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL ’ Y F.
265, 280 (2002)).
127
Forensic Evidence.com, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
http://forensic-evidence.com/site/EVID/EL00003_4.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2007).
128
David Bernstein, Daubert and Amended FRE 702, T HE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY, Nov. 3, 2005, http://volokh.com/posts/1131073785.shtml. The
current FED . R. EVID . 702 provides that an expert may issue an expert opinion
in a case if that opinion will assist the trier of fact and “if (1) the testimony is
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requires that the proponent of the evidence not only convince the
trial judge that it is sufficiently reliable, but must also demonstrate
that the testifying expert has applied the evidence reliably to the
particular facts in the case.129 This restriction is indicative of an
overall trend of a tightening of the Daubert standard.
2.

The Epidemiology Requirement

Although the Federal Rules of Evidence, Daubert, and
subsequent federal decisions130 provide some direction for federal
judges regarding the admissibly of scientific evidence, they are not
bright-line standards. 131 Trial judges, therefore, have a great deal of
discretion when carrying out their role as evidentiary gatekeepers.132 This has opened the door for many courts to take a
narrow interpretation of the seemingly liberal language of the
Daubert decision.133
One manifestation of this narrow approach to Daubert is that
the tort system has become partial to epidemiological studies134 to
establish causation in toxic tort cases. This epidemiological
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.” FED . R. EVID . 702.
129
FED . R. EVID . 702.
130
See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999);
General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
131
Alberts, supra note 88, at 46 (citing Confronting the New Challenges
of Scientific Evidence, 108 H ARV . L. REV . 1481, 1556–57 (1996)).
132
Alberts, supra note 88, at 46 (citing FED . R. EVID . 702).
133
Carolyn Raffensperger & Nancy Myers, Detox For Torts: How to Bring
Justice Back to the Court System, SCI . & ENVTL . HEALTH NETWORK, July
2003, at 8, available at http://www.sehn.org/rtfdocs/white-paper.doc; Garrett,
supra note 13, at 527 (stating:
This inconsistency is partially due to the fact that the decision
symbolized more than its words suggested. Hidden behind the Court’s
decision lay the unspoken objective of finding a new rule that would
keep so-called ‘junk science’ out of the courtroom. Daubert’s emphasis
on reliability and the role of the judge as gatekeeper served as a
message to lower courts to take admissibility requirements seriously.).
134

Garrett, supra note 13, at 528.
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preference may have originated with “the general judicial backlash
against ‘junk science’135 and more specifically to Judge Jack
Weinstein’s highly influential” Agent Orange decision in 1985.136
In that decision, Judge Weinstein found that epidemiological
studies were “the only useful studies having any bearing on
causation” because non-epidemiological studies “rest on surmise
and inapposite extrapolation.”137
Some judges have followed suit by entirely rejecting nonepidemiological evidence because they find it irrelevant to causation
issues in humans.138 For instance, some courts have refused to
135

This term refers to scientific evidence that is flawed in its methodology
or is for some other reason misleading or inaccurate. See, e.g., Joelle Anne
Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans That
Divide Science and Law With Justice Breyer At the Helm, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 1033,
1091 n.18 (2001) (stating:
Junk science is the mirror image of real science, with much of the same
form but none of the same substance. There is the astronomer, on the
one hand, and the astrologist, on the other . . . . [Junk science] is a
hodgepodge of biased data, spurious inference, and logical legerdemain,
patched together by researchers whose enthusiasm for discovery and
diagnosis far outstrips their skill. It is a catalog of every conceivable
kind of error: data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent dogmatism,
and, now and then, outright fraud.).
136

Garrett, supra note 13, at 528–29 (citing In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.
1987)). In In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., the plaintiffs consisted of
veterans and their families who claimed to suffer from various injuries as a result
of exposure to a chemical called “Agent Orange” which was used in Vietnam as
an herbicide. The plaintiffs sued the makers of the chemical. The court, however,
held that the opinions of the experts put forth by the plaintiffs were inadmissible
because they lacked the requisite reliability and the complaints were dismissed.
Id.
137
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2124 (citing
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987)).
138
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 8; see also In re
Phenylpropanolamine, 2003 WL22417238, at *12 (“[S]ome courts have held
that animal studies are not a valid basis for extrapolating conclusions about
human disease causation.”); Alberts, supra note 88, at 51–52 (“[Animal
studies] are of so little probative force and are so potentially misleading as to be
inadmissible.”); Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.
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consider animal studies on the grounds that laboratory animals may
react differently to medications than humans.139 However, this is
contrary to FRE 703 which permits experts to testify about their
opinions when they are based upon the same types of studies
relied upon by their colleagues when making non-litigation
professional judgments. 140 It is also contrary to Daubert because
Daubert included “general acceptance within the scientific
community” as one of its factors for determining reliability. 141
Since scientists regularly use non-epidemiological studies to assess
whether particular substances pose a human risk,142 this type of
evidence does “hold some utility in helping to establish causality in
toxic tort cases.”143 The absolute exclusion of non-epidemiological
evidence is overly restrictive and omits “vast areas of scientific
knowledge and . . . many legitimate tools of investigation.”144
When judges exclude non-epidemiological evidence, they
2002) (citing Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (stating:
[C]ase reports are not reliable scientific evidence of causation, because
they simply described reported phenomena without comparison to the
rate at which the phenomena occur in the general population or in a
defined control group; do not isolate and exclude potentially alternative
causes; and do not investigate or explain the mechanism of causation).
139

Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 302 n.81 (quoting
Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1480 (D.V.I.
1994)).
140
Forensic Evidence.com, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
http://forensic-evidence.com/site/EVID/EL00003_4.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2007) (stating that “under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the emphasis shifted,
away from the admissibility of the facts upon which an expert’s opinion was
based, to the reliability of these facts as determined by the profession in arriving
at professional judgments independent of litigation.”).
141
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
142
Alberts, supra note 88, at 51–52 (citing Casey, 877 F. Supp. at 1385);
see also In re Phenylpropanolamine, 2003 WL 22417238, at *29; see also
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 4 (“Scientists themselves rely on
animal studies, models, systematic field observations, and even causal
observations as sources of knowledge—but ‘sound science’ advocates tend to
discredit such knowledge.”).
143
Garrett, supra note 13, at 531.
144
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 4.
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unilaterally increase the plaintiff’s causation burden by requiring
that each piece of evidence not only be reliable, as required under
the Daubert standard, but also that plaintiff’s experts be able “to
demonstrate before trial that each study relied upon can on its own
prove the plaintiff’s case.”145 Since many types of studies cannot
meet this elevated burden, critical pieces of evidence are often
excluded. As a result, many plaintiffs with legitimate claims are
unable to proceed with their cases because they are left with little
or no evidence.146 Further, even if they are able to proceed, they are
prejudiced because juries are left to render verdicts without having
the opportunity to consider all of the relevant evidence.147
Another problem plaintiffs face is that even when
epidemiological data is available, the data is not always adequate
proof that it is “more likely than not” that the medication can cause
the type of injury that he or she has sustained.148 Many courts
require that an epidemiological study show a relative risk ratio149 of
145

Klass, supra note 113, at 112.
Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 205–06 (citing PROJECT ON
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND PUB. POL ’ Y , DAUBERT: T HE MOST INFLUENTIAL
SUPREME COURT RULING YOU ’ VE NEVER HEARD OF 3 (Tellus Institute June
2003), available at http://www.defendingscience.org/upload/Daubert-The-MostInfluential-Supreme-Court-Decision-You-ve-Never-Heard-Of-2003.pdf); see also
Garrett, supra note 13, at 519 (stating:
Causal mechanisms for toxic torts are notoriously complex, and
because toxins cannot be directly tested on humans for obvious ethical
reasons, even epidemiological studies are often unable to conclusively
determine the effects of a suspected toxin . . . Because epidemiological
data are frequently inconclusive, imprecise, or unavailable for newlydeveloped toxins, the tort system’s single-minded faith in
epidemiology prevents victims of toxic torts from recovering even when
they have a legitimate claim.).
146

147

Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 7; see also Garrett, supra
note 13, at 531 (“[P]laintiffs are unfairly prejudiced by the tort system’s
reluctance to allow animal studies, in vitro studies, chemical structure analysis,
and case reports.”).
148
Alberts, supra note 88, at 50 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.
Corp., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995)).
149
See generally Smith, supra note 35, at 236 (stating:
Relative risk is commonly calculated by dividing the risk of
developing a disease observed in an exposed group by the risk observed
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at least 2.0 to be considered sufficiently significant to meet the
“more likely than not” burden.150 In other words, the study must
show that the risk of injury was at least twice as high for
individuals who ingested the medication.151 Even if a study showed
that the ingestion of a particular medication resulted in a 99%
increased risk of a particular injury, it would not satisfy this
admissibility standard152 and would be excluded in the Daubert
hearing.153 Therefore, this bright-line standard may preclude the
in an unexposed, but otherwise similar group. If the risks of the
unexposed and exposed are the same, then the relative risk estimate is
1.0. . . . Thus a relative risk of 1.0 means that the agent has no effect
on the incidence of disease. Similarly, if the relative risk estimate is
1.3, then risk appears to be 30% higher among the exposed compared
to the non-exposed. When the relative risk reaches 2.0, the risk has
doubled, indicating that the risk is twice as high among the exposed
group as compared to the non-exposed group.).
150

Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 8; Alberts, supra note 88, at
50 (“Although on remand the Ninth Circuit in Daubert held that a relative risk
ratio of greater than two is not an absolute prerequisite when establishing
causation, courts have generally disallowed evidence that does not meet this
standard.”); see also Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at
2126 (stating:
The strength of the association is typically expressed by
epidemiologists in terms of relative risk. A relative risk of 1.0 indicates
no observed difference between the groups being compared. A relative
risk over 1.0 is not, however, an irrefutable indicator of causation. As
an abstract proposition, unless the ratio is at least 2.0, no plaintiff will
be able to prove that his or her disease was more likely than not
attributable to the defendant’s product.).
151

Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 111 (citing In re Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 758 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); rev’d on
other grounds, 964 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1992); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958–59 (3d Cir. 1990); Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127
N.J. 404, 605 A.2d 1079, 1087 (1992)).
152
Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 111.
153
Alberts, supra note 88, at 50, 54; see also David L. Faigman, Maping
the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 555, 568 (1995) (“In
deciding whether to admit scientific evidence into court, judges confront the
same possibilities of error as scientists. The trial court makes what might be
termed a type I error when it admits scientific evidence that is invalid; and it
makes a type II error when it excludes evidence that is valid.”).
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admissibility of important evidence that, when viewed in light of all
the evidence, is probative of causation.154
Epidemiological studies may also fall short of meeting the
plaintiff’s causation burden because they are uncontrolled studies
that are “notoriously subject to confounders and bias.”155 Some
epidemiological studies have been criticized for failing to be
“gender, race or class neutral.”156 Critics also point out that the
medication “may not have been tested in interaction with other
substances, tested on a representative sample of the population, or
had its effects tracked over time.”157 Further, epidemiological
studies may underestimate the risk associated with a drug because
they “favor . . . false negatives (a test result wrongly showing a risk
not to be present when it is) rather than false positive (a test result
wrongfully showing a risk to be present when it is not).”158 As a
result of these shortcomings, the studies may either be inadmissible
at trial or may be useless in helping the plaintiff conclusively prove
causation.159
Evidentiary restrictions are particularly prejudicial to childplaintiffs alleging injuries as a result of their ingestion of unsafe
medications because children’s medications are often inadequately
tested.160 Thus, epidemiological studies focusing upon children’s
154

See Alan Golansky, General Causation At a Crossroads in Toxic Tort
Cases, 108 PENN ST . L. R EV . 479, 488–96 (2003).
155
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 5.
156
Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 304 (citing Lucinda
M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using
Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL
L. REV . 335, 374 (1999)).
157
Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 303–04 (citing
Petersen, supra note 15, at 11; Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastonmond,
Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort
Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform?, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (2001).
158
Garrett, supra note 13, at 519 (citing Lars Persson & Kristin ShraderFrechette, An Evaluation of the Ethical Principles of the ICRP’s Radiation
Protection Standards for Workers, 80 H EALTH PHYSICS 225, 228 (2001)).
159
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 5.
160
See Garrett, supra note 13, at 530 (“With suspected toxins, moral
concerns preclude conducting controlled tests on human subjects.”).
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medications frequently do not exist at all.161 Further, even when
epidemiological studies on medications that are administered to
children have been conducted, children are rarely included in the
study population.162 As a result, the admissibility of the evidence
is called into question because the subjects of the study did not
have the same physical characteristics as the plaintiff, and therefore
“even less scientific evidence on exposure levels and effect is
available.”163
As a result of Daubert and subsequent decisions regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony, “the federal courts ha[ve] made
it very difficult for a plaintiff to successfully prosecute a toxic tort
case.”164 While science tends “to be very conservative in reaching
conclusions on cause and effect and to err on the side of showing
no effects when there may indeed be effects,” courts take the
Daubert mandate too far, putting forth unrealistic, “overly
stringent and specific scientific standards” that plaintiffs simply
cannot meet with the scientific evidence that is available.165 If a
defendant in a toxic tort case is successful in having the plaintiff’s
evidence excluded in a pre-trial Daubert hearing, the plaintiff will
be unable to prove causation—“a crucial element of the plaintiff’s
case.”166 Before the case has even gone to trial, it will end in
summary judgment, which “means the end of the case for the
plaintiff.”167
The plaintiffs in Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp. were unable to
overcome the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 168 In
161

See Garrett, supra note 13, at 530.
Klass, supra note 113, at 110 (citing JOHN W ARGO, OUT CHILDREN ’S
T OXIC LEGACY: H OW SCIENCE AND LAW FAIL TO P ROTECT US FROM
PESTICIDES 177–78 (1996)).
163
Klass, supra note 113, at 110.
164
Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 260.
165
Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 260.
166
Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 290.
167
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 8 (emphasis in original); see
also Alberts, supra note 88, at 40–41.
168
Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)
(Plaintiffs claimed that a drug they had used to suppress lactation after giving
birthParlodelhad caused them to suffer hemorrhagic strokes).
162
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Rider, the plaintiffs’ experts relied primarily on case reports of
other individuals who had suffered similar injuries after ingesting
the drug in order to provide a causal link between the drug and the
injury. 169 Since there was no epidemiological evidence, the court
had to determine whether the plaintiffs had presented sufficient
causation evidence to meet Daubert requirements.170 In finding the
case report evidence insufficient to establish causation, the court
demonstrated its distrust of the evidence and noted that case
reports “reflect only reported data, not scientific methodology.”171
Further, despite pointing out that, generally speaking, a lack of
epidemiological evidence “is not fatal to a plaintiff’s case,”172 the
court found that the case reports provided only “anecdotal
support” and were not enough to overcome the lack of
epidemiological evidence in this case.173 Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.174
Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. is a more recent example of
the preclusive effect of a narrow Daubert interpretation.175 The
169

Id. at 1199.
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 1198.
173
Id. at 1199 (“Some case reports do contain details of the treatment and
differential diagnosis. Even these more detailed case reports, however, are not
reliable enough, by themselves, to demonstrate the causal link the plaintiffs
assert that they do because they report symptoms observed in a single patient in
an uncontrolled context.”).
174
Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d at 1195–96 (citing Rosen v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996)) (reasoning that:
In the absence of epidemiology, plaintiffs may still prove medical
causation by other evidence. In the instant case, however, plaintiffs
simply have not provided reliable evidence to support their
conclusions. To admit the plaintiffs’ evidence, the Court would have to
make several scientifically unsupported “leaps of faith” in the causal
chain. The Daubert rule requires more. Given time, information, and
resources, courts may only admit the state of science as it is. Courts are
cautioned not to admit speculation, conjecture, or inference that cannot
be supported by sound scientific principles. “The courtroom is not the
place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort. Law lags
science; it does not lead it.”).
170

175

397 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2005).
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plaintiff in Norris claimed that her silicone breast implants had
caused her to experience a systemic allergic reaction.176 The
plaintiff’s expert relied on case studies that “showed a correlation
between women with breast implants and the development of
systemic disease.”177 However, the Tenth Circuit held that the case
studies “did not provide an adequate scientific basis from which to
conclude that breast implants in fact cause disease”178 and
“emphasiz[ed] the district court’s finding that epidemiological
evidence is the best evidence of general causation in a toxic tort
case.”179 Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment. 180
Children with toxic tort claims are adversely affected by narrow
interpretations of the Daubert decision. For instance, in 1998 and
1999 the Eighth Circuit heard two cases involving plaintiffs who
claimed that their birth defects resulted from their mothers’
pesticide exposure during pregnancy.181 The plaintiffs’ experts
176

Id. at 880 (stating:
Beginning in 1987, Plaintiff began to suffer from a variety of ailments
including pain in her right shoulder and foot and pain and swelling in
her right knee, hip, and other joints. On October 23, 1989, Plaintiff had
both implants removed because her doctor believed that she had
silicone-induced lupus. The diagnosis was subsequently changed by
Dr. Vasey, one of Plaintiff’s proffered experts, to silicone-associated
connective tissue disease-autoimmune disease caused by silicone which
leaked from breast implants. This disease allegedly caused Plaintiff to
suffer tenderness in the muscles of her mid and low back in addition to
joint swelling in her upper extremities.).
177

Nina Adatia, Recent Developments in Health Law: Select Recent Court
Decisions: Expert Testimony: Experts Must Address Negative Epidemiology to
Survive Summary Judgment in Products Liability Cases Involving Silicone
Breast Implants—Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878 (10th Cir.
2005), 31 AM . J.L. & MED . 384, 385 (2005) (citing Norris, 397 F.3d at 885).
178
Adatia, supra note 177, at 385.
179
Id. (citing Norris, 397 F.3d at 882); but see Adatia, supra note 177, at
386 (“The Tenth Circuit emphasized that epidemiological evidence is not
always required to establish causation in toxic tort liability suits.”).
180
Adatia, supra note 177, at 386.
181
Klass, supra note 113, at 112–13 (citing Nat’l Bank of Commerce, of
El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 1999)
(stating:
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relied upon scholarly articles, studies conducted by the
manufacturer, letters from the manufacturer to the Environmental
Protection Agency, and animal studies.182 However, the experts
were unable to point to any epidemiological evidence which
“consistently and repeatedly demonstrate[ed] any statistical
association between the exposure of pregnant women to Dursban
[the pesticide] and any increase in human birth defect” in their
children.183 As a result, the court of appeals found in both cases
that the plaintiffs could not meet the scientific evidentiary
requirements of Daubert, and therefore, could not go forward with
the litigation.184
Jerry and Patricia Arnold had problems with roaches and other
household insects. To eliminate the problem, they allegedly purchased
and applied three pesticides . . . [which they] contend they were
using . . . when their son and daughter-in-law, Michael and Debra
Arnold, moved into their home in December of 1992. Around the time
they moved in, Debra Arnold became pregnant with Matthew Arnold
who was born September 7, 1993. The use of pesticides allegedly
continued throughout the early stages of Debra Arnold’s pregnancy,
that is until April 1, 1993. When Matthew Arnold was born, he
suffered from multiple birth defects. The Arnolds filed this action in
federal district court alleging negligence, products liability, and breach
of warranty claims.);
Nat’l Bank of Commerce, of El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 133 F.3d
1132, 1132 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), aff’d 965 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Ark.
1996) (“Ashley Smits was born with severe birth defects. During her pregnancy,
Ashley’s mother had been exposed to Dursban LO (a pesticide) and Firefog 404
(a reoderant). Plaintiffs filed suit against various defendants contending that these
chemical agents, either singly or in combination, were the cause of Ashley’s
abnormalities.”).
182
Klass, supra note 113, at 113.
183
Klass, supra note 113, at 113 (quoting Nat’l Bank of Commerce, of El
Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1528 (E.D. Ark. 1996)).
184
Klass, supra note 113, at 112–13; but see Klass, supra note 113, at 116
(In 2003, the Florida Supreme Court in Castillo v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1270 (Fla. 2003) “held that human epidemiological
studies were not necessary in this case because pesticide exposure of this kind
was rare to begin with, and it would be unethical to expose humans to a
substance known to cause birth defects in animals for testing purposes.”); $95
Million Award to 8-Year-Old Boy in Lawsuit on Drug, N.Y. T IMES, July 15,
1987, at A25 (discussing a 1987 case in which an eight year old boy received a
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Children who brought claims against the manufacturers of cold
medications containing Phenylpropanolamine faced similar
evidentiary problems. Those plaintiffs claimed they suffered
adverse reactions, including strokes and cardiac arrest, from the
ingestion of Phenylpropanolamine (“PPA”), an ingredient that was
in many children’s cough and cold medications.185 PPA was
removed from the market in 2000 after the FDA concluded that
there was an association between PPA ingestion and hemorrhagic
strokes.186 The primary piece of evidence that led the FDA to this
conclusion was the Yale Study—a five-year epidemiological study
which found a “link between [PPA] and hemorrhagic stroke.”187
The $5 million study was funded by the Consumer Healthcare
Products Association (the nonprescription drug industry’s trade
group), 188 and “looked at 702 men and women . . . who had been
hospitalized with hemorrhagic strokes, characterized by bleeding in
the brain.”189
$95 million jury verdict after using animal test results to establish a causal
connection between Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug used during pregnancy, and
his birth defects).
185
Drugs Containing PPA, USA T ODAY , November 7, 2000, at 3B
(Some children’s medications that contained Phenylpropanolamine included
Triaminic DM Cough Relief, Triaminic Expectorant Chest and Head
Congestion, Triaminic Syrup Cold and Allergy, and Triaminic Triaminicol
Cold & Cough); see also Sheryl Stolberg, Ingredient in Popular Medicines in
Linked to Strokes, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), October 20, 2000, at 1A
(“Phenylpropanolamine, or PPA, had been used for more than [fifty] years,
primarily in nonprescription cold and cough remedies as well as in appetite
suppressants and some prescription decongestants. Dozens of products contain
PPA, including some intended for children; the food and drug agency said 6
billion doses were sold [in 1999] alone.”).
186
Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A (“In recommending that the ingredient
be banned from over-the-counter drugs, the [Food and Drug Administration’s]
staff ha[d] already concluded that phenylpropanolamine [wa]s responsible for
between 200 to 500 strokes each year in people aged [eighteen] to [forty-nine],
primarily women and first time users of the drug.”).
187
Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A.
188
Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A.
189
Leigh Hopper, Area Pharmacies Pull Medications After FDA’s Alert,
HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 8, 2000, at A41; see Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A
(After the results of the study were released, “scientists who spoke on behalf of
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Because the Yale Study did not include any children, defendant
manufacturers argued that the results of the study were not
applicable to children and could not be used to prove general
causation in that population.190 Since this was the only
epidemiological study that had been conducted to look at the
effects of PPA, child plaintiffs faced a significant hurdle in proving
general causation.
3.

The Goals of Tort Law Are Not Being Achieved

A rigid judicial approach to the admission of causation evidence
fails to serve many of the purposes of tort law, including “adequate
compensation, deterrence, and loss spreading.”191 Children who
have suffered injuries at the hands of manufacturers that have
produced unsafe medications are not adequately compensated
because the judicial system requires the victims to “produce
evidence from nonexistent information.”192 As we have seen, the
type of evidence that would satisfy the strict evidentiary standards
that many courts have imposed following the Daubert line of cases
simply does not exist in most of these cases because most
children’s medications are not sufficiently tested on children,
thereby perpetuating the dearth of admissible evidence for childplaintiffs. “[T]he more stringently trial courts insist on
epidemiological studies, . . . the more likely the . . . plaintiff[s] will
be to lose.”193
the nonprescription drug industry . . . insisted the . . . study, which was paid
for by their own trade group,” was “‘a failed study’ because it ‘contained too
few patients to be statistically significant and that the strokes occurring in people
taking phenylpropanolamine could have been caused by other factors, such as
drug and alcohol abuse.’”).
190
See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability
Litigation, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1236 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“Defendants . . .
focus on the parameters and results of the [Yale Study], arguing that the study
lacks reliability as to certain ‘sub-populations,’ including men, individuals
below age eighteen and above age forty-nine, and individuals suffering strokes
more than three days after ingestion of PPA.”).
191
Garrett, supra note 13, at 553.
192
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14.
193
Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 85, at 304.
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Excessively strict evidentiary standards also inhibit tort law’s
deterrence objective. Manufacturers will continue to put children’s
medications on the shelves despite a lack of adequate testing
because they know that they will benefit from doing so: if
manufacturers do not conduct epidemiological testing, plaintiffs’
claims will be dismissed because they will not have adequate
evidence to meet their causation burden.194 In this way, a “[l]ack of
data is actually protective of defendants in these circumstances.
They are better off not knowing the risk posed by their products.
If they test and litigation begins, they will have to turn over testing
results during discovery.”195 Further, even when manufacturers do
conduct safety testing, narrow evidentiary standards create a
disincentive for them to disclose the findings if they are not
favorable.196 In this way, “the current system actually protects
manufacturers who ignore or conceal evidence of toxicity”197 rather
than encouraging them to take responsible measures to minimize
the risks to their consumers.
The tort system’s goal of loss spreading198 is also inhibited by
194

Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14.
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14; see also Berger,
Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2134 (“Current law
encourages corporations to engage in ostrich-like behavior that keeps them from
knowing or investigating risk, because the future likelihood that a causal
connection can be proved between the corporation’s conduct and plaintiffs’
injury appears minimal compared to the cost of present compliance.”); Wagner,
supra note 25, at 1636–37 (“[A]ctors benefit from knowing nothing, in part
because it deprives plaintiffs of the evidence that they need to bring their case.”).
196
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2119 n.8
(stating:
The emerging field of toxic torts is characterized by its lack of
information for decision making, and not by its ability to generate
data . . . . [T]he industrial defendant is typically in the best position to
create the necessary data, but its incentives are the reverse. In the
absence of dramatic changes to encourage defendants to generate and
disclose potentially inculpatory toxicity evidence, tort law is unlikely
to be a major factor in creating toxics data.).
195

197

Garrett, supra note 13, at 520.
See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL T HEORY 57, 68 (David Patterson ed.,
Blackwell Publ’g, 1996).
198
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an overly restrictive application of the Daubert standard. The goal
would be better served by a system that holds manufacturers,
“who generally possess the most knowledge about the agent and
the greatest resources for further research,”199 financially
responsible for the injuries that result from their defective
products, rather than placing the financial burden of the injury on
the victims. However, the current system often does the opposite
by shielding manufacturers from liability through stringent
evidentiary standards, while “the burden of proof is heavily
skewed toward plaintiffs.”200 Thus, the victims bear the financial
burdens of dealing with the sometimes catastrophic injuries that
children suffer following their ingestion of unsafe medications,
while large drug manufacturers continue to profit.
Finally, “[t]he causation model is . . . inconsistent with notions
of moral responsibility underlying tort law.”201 In addition to
encouraging manufacturers to avoid behavior that could make their
products safer, courts fail to reward manufacturers when they take
steps to act responsibly. 202 As Professor Margaret Berger has
noted, “a system that encourages a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy
decouples liability from moral responsibility and thus threatens the
basic underpinnings of corrective justice.”203
III. PROPOSALS
A. New Legislation
Some legal scholars suggest that reformers should concentrate
less on causation issues and more on creating incentives for drug
manufacturers to “keep [themselves] reasonably informed about
the risks of [their] products.”204 Further, commentators have called

199
200
201
202
203
204

Garrett, supra note 13, at 520.
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14.
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2117.
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2117.
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14.
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14.
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for manufacturers to share such information with the consumer.205
One way to accomplish this goal would be to “[reform] tort law by
creating a new cause of action, sounding in negligence, under which
manufacturers could be held liable for ‘failure to provide substantial
information relating to risk.’”206 This proposal would ease
plaintiffs’ causation burden because it would focus on the conduct
of the manufacturer and would not “[require] proof that such
failure ‘caused [the] plaintiff’s injury.’”207 Professor Margaret
Berger has endorsed the creation of this “new toxic tort,” stating
that “[i]f a corporation fails to exercise the appropriate level of due
care, it should be held liable to those put at risk by its action.”208
Another proposal attempts to address the lack of
epidemiological evidence, calling for the legislature to enact a law
under which manufacturers of children’s medications would be
required to contribute to an independent scientific research fund.209
The fund would then be used “to conduct comprehensive
retrospective exposure analyses and epidemiologic studies of all the
populations which have been exposed.”210 In theory, this approach
would help diminish the incentives that the current causation
scheme creates for drug manufacturers “not to know and not to
disclose” the risks associated with their products.211 However,
because of the ethical, legal, and practical difficulties associated
with the testing of medications in adolescent populations, such a
law may prove infeasible.

205

Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL ’ Y 65, 83 (2006).
Brennan, supra note 107, at 572 (quoting Berger, Eliminating General
Causation, supra note 29, at 2143).
207
Brennan, supra note 107, at 572 (quoting Berger, Eliminating General
Causation, supra note 29, at 2143).
208
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14 (quoting Berger,
Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2134).
209
Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 224.
210
Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 224.
211
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2119.
206
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B. A Broader Range of Admissible Evidence

Other proposals focus on the variety of scientific research and
evidence that courts can and should admit in toxic tort cases.212
Plaintiffs would be permitted to introduce the types of evidence
that scientists routinely rely upon to prove causation “such as
animal studies, in vitro studies, chemical structure analysis, [and]
case reports,”213 thereby diminishing the epidemiological evidence
requirement that many courts have adopted with respect to
causation issues. This policy would be consistent with FRE 703,
which allows evidence to be introduced when it is the type of
evidence upon which scientists regularly rely. It would be also be
consistent with the courts’ opinions in Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Co.214 and Wells v. Ortho.Corp.,215 recognizing that
212

See, e.g., Gold, supra note 97, at 393–94.
Garrett, supra note 13, at 528–29.
214
736 F.2d 1529, 1531–32 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating:
Ferebee, an agricultural worker at the Beltsville Agricultural Research
Center (BARC), an installation of the United States Department of
Agriculture located in Beltsville, Maryland, allegedly contracted
pulmonary fibrosis as a result of long-term skin exposure to dilute
solutions of paraquat, a herbicide distributed in the United States solely
by Chevron. When Ferebee died before trial, his estate continued with a
survival action and a wrongful death count was added on behalf of his
minor children.).
213

215

788 F.2d 741, 742–43 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating:
Katie Laurel Wells was born on July 1, 1981 with birth defects
including deformity of her right hand, the complete lack of a left arm
with only partial development of her left clavicle and shoulder, a cleft
lip, and nostril deformity. A later diagnosis showed that she also has
an optic nerve defect in her right eye. The plaintiffs alleged that these
birth defects were caused by a spermicidal jelly used by the mother for
approximately four weeks after conception until she discovered that she
was pregnant. The spermicidal jelly used by Mary Maihafer, in
conjunction with a diaphragm, was manufactured and marketed without
a prescription by Ortho. Called Ortho-Gynol Contraceptive Jelly
(“Ortho-Gynol”), this vaginal spermicide has as its active ingredient a
non-ionic surfactant known as Octoxynol-9. The Ortho-Gynol label and
package insert in 1980 contained only this warning—the spermicide
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“scientists ought to be allowed to testify even when
epidemiological studies do not exist ‘as long as the basic
methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is sound.’”216
Finally, it would comport with Justice Stevens’s view that
“Daubert was intended to allow a ‘weight of the evidence’
approach that considers all available scientific evidence, as opposed
to a threshold approach that demands epidemiological studies.”217
This policy would have many advantages over the current
approach taken by many courts, as it would acknowledge the
“subtlety, complexity, strengths, and weakness of different kinds
of scientific evidence—and not . . . overly simpl[ify] [the] rules for
admitting or barring available evidence.”218 Such a shift in policy
would also stay true to the nature of the adversarial process by
allowing jurors to evaluate evidence that is currently being excluded
by judges in pre-trial Daubert hearings, thus leaving “fact-finders
free to decide which of the many inferences urged on them are
reasonable.”219 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this
approach would help to counteract the current state of affairs in
which children who have been injured by unsafe medications are
unable to recover damages because epidemiological evidence is
either inapplicable or unavailable and the scientific evidence that is

might cause irritation to the female or male genitalia, is not 100 percent
effective, and should be kept out of the reach of children. Plaintiffs
brought suit against Ortho alleging that Ortho-Gynol caused Katie
Wells’ birth defects, that Ortho negligently failed to warn that its
spermicide could cause serious birth defects, and that Ortho’s failure to
warn proximately caused the birth defects. Plaintiffs sought damages for
Katie Wells’ pain and suffering, medical expenses and disability, as
well as Mary Maihafer’s emotional distress and lost wages.).
216

Garrett, supra note 13, at 555 (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535–36).
Garrett, supra note 13, at 555 (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 153).
218
Garrett, supra note 13, at 532 (quoting Carl F. Cranor, Asymmetric
Information, The Precautionary Principle, and Burdens of Proof, in
PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & T HE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING T HE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 74, 89, 555 (1999) (“[S]cientific methodologies
like animal studies, chemical structure analyses, in vitro analyses, and case
studies can serve as reliable scientific evidence to establish causation.”).
219
Gold, supra note 97, at 394.
217
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available is deemed inadmissible.220
C. Lower Causation Burden
In order to deal with the seemingly “insurmountable” causation
burden that plaintiffs face when epidemiological evidence is
unavailable, some scholars/critics suggest that the courts “[allow]
the plaintiff to proceed with relatively less evidence than would be
required if there were a substantial body of [evidence].”221 This is
the approach that the courts took in both Heller v. Shaw Indus.222
and Zuchowicz v. United States.223 Plaintiffs’ experts would “be
220

See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA), Mass Tort Code 264,
2003 WL22417238, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 21, 2003).
221
Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 131; but see id. at 132
(“Here, as in other areas of causal uncertainty, we are left with the question of
how far the courts should go in easing the plaintiff’s burden of proof.”).
222
167 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1999) (“This is an appeal by plaintiff Carol
Heller (“Heller”), who sought to recover from defendant Shaw Industries
(“Shaw”), for certain respiratory illnesses allegedly caused by volatile organic
compounds emitted by Shaw carpet installed in Heller’s former home.”).
223
140 F.3d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating:
This suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b),
2671-2680, was originally filed by Patricia Zuchowicz, who claimed to
have developed primary pulmonary hypertension, a fatal lung
condition, as a result of the defendant’s negligence in prescribing an
overdose of the drug Danocrine. Following Mrs. Zuchowicz’s death in
1991, her husband, Steven, continued the case on behalf of his wife’s
estate, claiming that the defendant was responsible for her death.).
See also Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 131; James v. Bessemer
Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279, 300 (1998) (“In our toxic-tort precedents, this
Court has tried to strike a balance with regard to proof of causation that is fair to
both plaintiffs and defendants in view of the almost certain lack of direct
scientific proof in such cases.”); but see Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note
83, at 131–32 (stating:
However, courts have not been willing to . . . adopt the proposals of
some commentators argue that, in situations of irreducible causal
uncertainty, the plaintiff should either be relieved of the burden of
persuasion on the causal question or should be permitted some
percentage recovery, as long as the plaintiff could establish strong
uncertainty about causation.).
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permitted to render an opinion on general causation with little or no
epidemiological evidence and sometimes with very little
toxicological evidence.”224 It would then be up to the trier of fact to
determine what weight to give the experts’ opinions. As a result,
fewer plaintiffs’ cases would be dismissed on summary judgment
and more victims of dangerous medical products would receive the
compensation they deserve—or at least a fair review of their case.
D. Burden-Shifting
Another proposal that has received a great deal of attention
from the scholarly community would “[shift] the burden of proof
regarding general causation to defendants.”225 In this causation
scheme, plaintiffs would still bear the initial burden of presenting a
prima facie case. First, the plaintiffs would have to prove that they
ingested the manufacturer’s medication. Next, they would have to
show that the defendant sold an inadequately tested medication by
“pointing to specific testing or data collection for evidence not
already available through other means that the manufacturer could
have conducted.”226 After the prima facie case had been proven,
however, the burden would then shift to the defendants to disprove
general causation and specific causation.227 In this way, “it would
224

Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 83, at 131 (citing Lakie v.
Smithkline Beecham, 965 F. Supp. 49, 56 (D.D.C. 1997)).
225
Brennan, supra note 107, at 573; see also Klass, supra note 113, at 134
(discussing burden-shifting in the context of toxic tort cases that involve
chemicals that have been released into the environment).
226
Klass, supra note 113, at 134, 136.
227
Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2144–45; see
also Garrett, supra note 13, at 556; Brennan, supra note 107, at 573. To
disprove general causation, defendants would have to prove that the type of
adverse reaction claimed by the plaintiff is not associated with the defendant’s
medication. See Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at
2144–45; see also Garrett, supra note 13, at 556; Brennan, supra note 107, at
573. To disprove specific causation, defendants would have to prove that the
specific injury that the plaintiff suffered was not caused by the medication, but
rather by some alternative cause. See Berger, Eliminating General Causation,
supra note 29, at 2144–45; see also Garrett, supra note 13, at 556; Brennan,
supra note 107, at 573.
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be the defendant manufacturer, not the plaintiff, who would bear
the burden of scientific uncertainty,” because a lack of scientific
evidence would signify an inability to disprove causation.228
Burden shifting was first discussed in 1944 by Justice Roger
Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.229 Justice Traynor
noted that because “‘the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards
and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot,’
the tort system was justified in shifting to the defendant the burden
of proving that it had taken proper care to avoid the alleged
harm.”230 He further commented that “public policy demands that
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
the market.”231 More recently, many states have shifted the burden
in cases involving inadequate safety testing from the defendant to
the plaintiff, thereby resulting in compensation for the victim.232
The burden-shifting doctrine has the potential to “restore the
basic moral underpinnings to the law.”233 The implementation of
burden-shifting principles could serve the tort system’s retributive
purposes by holding manufacturers responsible for subjecting
consumers to the risk of injury.234 In Summers v. Tice,235 the
228

Klass, supra note 113, at 134 (citing Lynda M. Collins, Strange
Bedfellows? The Precautionary Principle and Toxic Tort: A Tort Paradigm for
st
the 21 Century, 35 ENVTL . L. REP . 10,361, 10,370 (2005)).
229
150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
230
Garrett, supra note 13, at 535 (quoting Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–41).
231
Garrett, supra note 13, at 535.
232
Klass, supra note 113, at 143.
233
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14 (“A corporation ought to
exercise a responsible level of due care and be held liable to those who have been
put in harm’s way by its action without regard to the actual harm. As Berger
says, a corporation should be culpable if it has acted without taking into account
the interests of those who will be affected by its conduct.”).
234
Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 133, at 14.
235
199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (stating:
Plaintiff’s action was against both defendants for an injury to his right
eye and face as the result of being struck by bird shot discharged from a
shotgun. The case was tried by the court without a jury and the court
found that on November 20, 1945, plaintiff and the two defendants were
hunting quail on the open range. Each of the defendants was armed with
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“court . . . reasoned that if determining causation . . . was difficult,
. . . ‘the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of his right
to redress,’ and ‘the wrongdoers are not in a position to complain
of uncertainty.’”236 Further, it is morally just for “those who stand
to profit from the product” to be left “with the responsibility of
demonstrating with a high level of confidence that harm will not
occur.”237
Burden-shifting spreads the costs of injuries resulting from
dangerous medications by placing the cost on the manufacturers
who produced them because they are in the best position to
“conduct the studies, to balance the cost of studies against the
potential cost of tort suits, and to distribute those costs.”238 The
court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories239 agreed, concluding that
“as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
a 12 gauge shotgun loaded with shells containing 7 1/2 size shot. Prior
to going hunting plaintiff discussed the hunting procedure with
defendants, indicating that they were to exercise care when shooting and
to “keep in line.” In the course of hunting plaintiff proceeded up a hill,
thus placing the hunters at the points of a triangle. The view of
defendants with reference to plaintiff was unobstructed and they knew
his location. Defendant Tice flushed a quail which rose in flight to a
10-foot elevation and flew between plaintiff and defendants. Both
defendants shot at the quail, shooting in plaintiff’s direction. At that
time defendants were 75 yards from plaintiff. One shot struck plaintiff in
his eye and another in his upper lip. Finally it was found by the court
that as the direct result of the shooting by defendants the shots struck
plaintiff as above mentioned and that defendants were negligent in so
shooting and plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.).
236

Klass, supra note 113, at 140 (quoting Summers, 199 P.2d at 5).
Garrett, supra note 13, at 520 (citing David Freestone, International
Fisheries Law Since Rio: The Continued Rise of the Precautionary Principle,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PAST
ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 135, 135 (Alan Boye et al. eds.,
1999).
238
Brennan, supra note 107, at 573; see also Taylor, supra note 79, at 1
(“the cost of injuries involving dangerous products should be borne by the
manufacturers, who are in the best position to minimize the risks and to spread
the cost through insurance.”)
239
607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (Plaintiffs were the children of women
who had ingested DES during their pregnancy and alleged that the chemical
resulted in injuries including a malignant bladder tumor).
237
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latter should bear the cost of the injury and that ‘from a broader
policy standpoint,’ defendants were better able to bear the cost of
injury resulting from the creation of a defective product.”240 Under
the current scheme, victims are often unsuccessful in bringing a
claim against the defendant manufacturer, and therefore bear the
entire costs of injury, including litigation fees, which can be
financially devastating.241 However with a burden-shifting
framework, defendant manufacturers would be able to spread the
associated costs of production, testing, and litigation defense to
their insurance carriers,242 consumers, and stockholders,, and “the
financial effect on each individual [would] likely [be] small.”243
Finally, shifting the causation burden to the manufacturers of
dangerous medications would also deter dangerous behavior.244 The
increased liability that pharmaceutical manufacturers would face
would be an incentive to take steps to avoid litigation in the first
instance.245 Drug companies would be more likely to conduct
adequate safety testing on children’s medications and to disclose
the results of that testing in an effort to disprove causation should
litigation occur.246 If, on the other hand, safety testing is not
feasible, manufacturers may be deterred from placing their product
on the market altogether.247 In this way, pharmaceutical
240

Klass, supra note 113, at 141–42 (citing Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936).
Garrett, supra note 13, at 558.
242
Taylor, supra note 79, at 1.
243
Garrett, supra note 13, at 558 (citing Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the
Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater: Justice Breyer’s Critique of
Regulation, 8 A DMIN . L.J. AM. U. 721, 732 (1995)).
244
Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 225.
245
Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 225; see also Taylor, supra
note 79, at 1 (“If injuries caused by dangerous products become a cost of doing
business for a producer . . . there will be an incentive to make safer products to
avoid liability.”).
246
See Brennan, supra note 107, at 573; see also Klass, supra note 113, at
135–37 (discussing the effect of burden shifting on pesticide manufacturers);
Garrett, supra note 13, at 559 (“The precautionary principle . . . encourag[es]
defendants to expose, not conceal, science so that they may escape liability by
showing that they are not to blame.”).
247
Roisman, Judy & Stein, supra note 79, at 217. (“If the real cost of
producing . . . a substance or product is so high when properly allocated that no
241
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manufacturers, who “have superior knowledge or access to
knowledge about the[ir] product,”248 would be “force[d] . . . to
fully take the costs of children’s health into account in analyzing
which products to place on the market and to conduct the scientific
studies necessary to ensure their safety.”249 Burden-shifting would
then deter manufacturers from gambling with the lives of their
customers and protect children from harm not only after injuries
have been sustained, but more importantly, before injuries ever
occur.250
E. A Recognized Right To Make An Informed Choice
Ethical concerns about children’s ability to give informed
consent for involvement in clinical testing are one of the main
reasons for the lack of safety testing on children’s medications. 251
This concern, however, is seemingly ignored once medications are
on the shelf because inadequate safety information and nonexistent
warnings deprive consumers “of the right to choose whether they
wish to subject themselves to the material risk of . . . harm.”252 In a
business can successfully survive, the solution is not to force innocent parties to
continue to absorb those costs but to stop manufacturing . . . the product and
develop a safer alternative.”); see also Klass, supra note 113, at 117–18 (stating:
In the end, the message to take away from the cases is somewhat
mixed. Liability verdicts against manufacturers can influence which
products are on the market and what warnings accompany those
products. Although manufacturers warn that valuable products will not
be available to consumers at low costs . . . it is not difficult to posit
that higher consumer costs may be a legitimate tradeoff for the removal
of products that are harmful to children’s health and that quite possibly
incur even larger and longer-term health-related costs to society.).
248

Garrett, supra note 13, at 559.
Klass, supra note 113, at 145.
250
See Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 29, at 2152
(“A chief objective of this proposal is to induce corporations to engage in far
more scientific research when it matters—not to win lawsuits but to protect
society against the risks posed by their products.”).
251
See, e.g. Garrett, supra note 13, at 530 (“With suspected toxins, moral
concerns preclude conducting controlled tests on human subjects.”).
252
Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 288.
249
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sense, therefore, children become unknowing participants in
informal experiments conducted by the pharmaceutical industry,
which nevertheless produce results (i.e., case studies) that are
usually deemed inadmissible by the courts when injuries arise.
Some scholars have argued that courts should recognize the
right of individuals to make an informed choice about whether or
not to expose themselves to medications that may pose a risk to
their health.253 To facilitate this patient right, pharmaceutical
manufacturers would be required to warn consumers about risks
that are reasonably foreseeable.254 The focus would therefore shift
away from the plaintiff’s burden in proving causation after an
injury has occurred, and move toward informing consumers about
the potential risks before the medication has been ingested.255
There have been many tort actions alleging that drug
manufacturers did not adequately warn consumers about the
dangers associated with their products. 256 For instance, the
manufacturer of Parlodel257a drug taken by women after
childbirth to suppress lactationdid not advise users about the
risk of stroke associated with the drug or of the simple and
possibly more effective alternative of ingesting aspirin.
Subsequently, the drug was taken off the market by the FDA
because the “possible risks outweigh[ed] the limited benefits.”258
However, women who had suffered the catastrophic effects of the
medication prior to its removal were left with little remedy because
most courts found that plaintiffs could not meet Daubert standards
regarding the causation issue.259 Certainly, these women would not
253

See Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 267–70 (explaining that courts
have held drug manufacturers liable in products liability cases where they have
“fail[ed] to provide adequate information about risks associated with a . . .
drug,” but that such liability has been contingent upon proof of a “causal
relationship between the uncertain risk and the plaintiff’s harm.”).
254
See Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 267–68.
255
See Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 267–68
256
See Berger & Twerski, supra note 10, at 269–70.
257
Sandoz/Novartis was the manufacturer of Parlodel. Berger & Twerski,
supra note 10, at 269.
258
Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1201 (11th Cir. 2002).
259
In Rider, the plaintiff’s claims against the drug manufacturer were
unsuccessful because United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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have taken the medication in the first place if they had been warned
of the dangers associated with the medication.
Bendectin is another example of a dangerous drug about which
users were not adequately warned.260 It was used from 1957
through 1983 to treat morning sickness in expectant mothers, but
the drug was taken off the shelves because of “widespread fears
that it caused severe birth defects [including limb reduction] in the
children whose mothers ingested the drug while pregnant.”261 When
parents of children who were born with the birth defects brought a
suit against the manufacturer of the drug, they relied upon a variety
of evidence, including “in vitro . . . studies, in vivo . . . studies,
chemical structure analyses, and retrospective epidemiological
studies.”262 While some early plaintiffs were victorious, the
majority of plaintiffs who brought claims against the manufacturer
of Bendectin were unsuccessful because the evidence was deemed
insufficient to establish a causal link.263 Perhaps a more equitable
result would have been reached if the court had recognized an
“informed choice” action because “[t]here is little doubt that the
determined that she could not meet Daubert standards on the issue of causation.
295 F.3d 1194.
260
See Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268–69.
261
Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268 (citing MICHAEL D. GREEN ,
BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: T HE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 91, 180 (1996)).
262
Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268; see also Extension
Toxicology Network, Epidemilogy, http://pmep.cce.cornell.edu/profiles/
extoxnet/TIB/epidemiology.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2007) (stating:
Epidemiological studies can be divided into two basic types depending
on (a) whether the events have already happened (retrospective) or (b)
whether the events may happen in the future (prospective). The most
common studies are the retrospective studies which are also called casecontrol studies. A case-control study may begin when an outbreak of
disease is noted and the causes of the disease are not known, or the
disease is unusual within the population studied.).
263

Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268 (citing DeLuca v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 943 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The district court held
that [the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert in pediatric pharmacology] would be
inadmissible at trial because it was not based on data of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the pertinent fields in issuing opinions on these subjects, as
is required by Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”).
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vast majority of expectant mothers suffering from the discomfort
of morning sickness would have refused to take Bendectin to
alleviate their discomfort if told that the drug carried with it an
uncertain risk of birth defects to their fetuses.”264
The right to make an informed choice is particularly important
when the drugs are not necessary treatments, but rather, treat
minor ailments, have “little therapeutic value,” or to which viable
alternatives are available.265 When these situations occur in
children’s medications, it is easy to understand that most parents
would have chosen to give their children an alternative therapy or
would have foregone treatment altogether had they been adequately
warned of the possible dangers.266 Take, for instance,
Phenylpropanolamine (“PPA”)—an ingredient that was found in
many over-the-counter children’s cough/cold medications for
decades.267 In recommending that PPA be taken off the market in
2000, the FDA considered that medications containing PPA were
used to treat run of the mill, non-life threatening illnesses for which
there were many viable alternative treatments, as well as the severe
risk of hemorrhagic stroke associated with use of the drug.268
Certainly, if parents were given the choice between subjecting their
child to a risk of hemorrhagic strokes or putting up with a runny
nose, the choice would have been clear.269 Nonetheless, the
manufacturers did not warn about the risks,270 and the total number
264

Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 269.
Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268, 288.
266
Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 268.
267
Drugs Containing PPA, supra note 185, at 3B.
268
Hopper, supra note 189, at A41. Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A
(Before the drug was removed from the market, the FDA had received 44 reports
of hemorrhagic strokes following the ingestion of PPA, and “officials said . . .
that the true number [wa]s probably much higher, due to underreporting.”).
269
See, e.g., Sheba R. Wheeler, Pharmacies Yank Products With FDAFlagged Ingredient, DENV. POST , November 8, 2000, at B-01 (reporting that
one customer, whose child was born just three days before the recall, indicated
that he was not worried about the news reports indicating that many cold
remedies and diet pills that contained phenylpropanolamine had been linked to
an increased rate of stroke, “until he realized that some children’s medications
might contain the problematic drug.”).
270
See Stolberg, supra note 185, at 1A (noting that the Consumer
265
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of children who were adversely affected by PPA may never be
known.
Safety concerns about children’s cough and cold medications
did not end when PPA-containing drugs were recalled.271 In
October 2007, the manufacturers of many popular children’s
medications withdrew their products from the market272 after the
FDA recommended that they should not be used in children under
age six.273 Before the voluntary recall by manufacturers, these
medications were widely available274 even though their safety or
efficacy had not been tested in pediatric populations. 275 More
disturbingly, after the FDA’s recommendations,276 some
manufacturers of children’s medications have chosen to keep their
products on the market.277 Perhaps if the courts recognized an
informed choice cause of action that was not contingent upon proof
of causation, manufacturers would be less willing to ignore the
reported dangers. In the meantime, children will continue to be
injured by medications that their parents may not have chosen to
give them had they received the proper information beforehand.278

Healthcare Products Association stated: “[o]ur members stand behind PPA as
safe and effective products when used according to label directions.”).
271
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 1, at A18.
272
Over-the-Counter Infant Cold Medications Recall Sparked by Safety
Concerns, www.newsinferno.com/archives/1902 (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
273
Hollis, supra note 2.
274
Over-the-Counter Infant Cold Medications Recall Sparked by Safety
Concerns, supra note 273 (“Prior to this recall, there were about 800 different
over-the-counter cold medications sold in the U.S. for use in young children.”).
275
Meadows, supra note 3, at 74; Over-the-Counter Infant Cold
Medications Recall Sparked by Safety Concerns, supra note 273 (The FDA
previously replied upon safety and dosing information that had been extrapolated
from adult studies).
276
McNeil Consumer Healthcare is Voluntarily Withdrawing Infants’
Cough and Cold Products, LAB BUSINESS W EEK , October 28, 2007, at 445.
277
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at A1 (“Despite the industry’s
recommendation, many companies—including such giants as Johnson &
Johnson—continue to sell cough and cold medicines with ‘infant’ in their titles
and pictures of babies on their labels.”).
278
See Berger and Twerski, supra note 10, at 288.
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CONCLUSION
Adverse drug reactions are one of the leading causes of death in
this country. Children are particularly at risk because ethical and
economic barriers often prevent or discourage children’s
pharmaceutical manufacturers from conducting adequate safety
testing. The recent removal of many children’s cough and cold
medications from pharmacy shelves has highlighted the risks that
result from inadequate safety testing. Federal legislative measures
aimed at increasing the amount of testing that is conducted on
pediatric medications have produced only limited success.
Therefore, new measures must be developed and implemented in
order to protect children from this disturbing threat.
The tort-system is well-suited for protecting children from the
adverse effects of unsafe medications because it has the capacity to
compensate victims, deter dangerous or negligent behavior by
manufacturers, and spread losses amongst those who are in the best
position to prevent them. However, narrow interpretations of
Daubert evidentiary standards often result in the exclusion of nonepidemiological evidence of causation, leaving child plaintiffs with
an insurmountable burden on this critical element of their toxic tort
claims. In this regard, defendant manufacturers actually benefit
from their own negligent behavior. That is, their failure to conduct
product safety tests insulates them from liability by depriving
plaintiffs of the critical scientific evidence they need to bring a
successful claim. Therefore, while the tort system has the potential
to protect children from dangerous pharmaceuticals, it is doing the
opposite.
Legal scholars have proposed a variety of measures to help
counteract the overwhelming challenges that plaintiffs face in
bringing toxic tort claims, including new legislation, a broader range
of admissible evidence, a lower causation burden, burden-shifting,
and the implementation of the consumer’s right to make an
informed choice. If implemented, these proposals would create
incentives for manufacturers to conduct adequate safety testing on
children’s medications or to keep such medications off the shelves
altogether. Further, if manufacturers chose to follow neither of
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these paths, they would face an increased likelihood of liability for
the injuries caused by their products. As a result, the tort system
would not only be better equipped to compensate children after
they sustain injuries from dangerous medications, but also, and
more importantly, to protect children from injuries before they
ever occur.

